Aloi v. Union Pacific Railroad Corp Brief

Aloi v. Union Pacific Railroad Corp., 123 P.3d 999 (Colo. 2006)

Facts:

            On August 27, 1998, Union Pacific assigned Frank Aloi to conduct a train.  Before the train departed, Aloi tripped and fell while descending interior stairs on the locomotive.  He also noticed a loose rubber mat that covered a vertical riser on a step.  Aloi told the locomotive’s engineer that he had tripped and the engineer inspected the stairwell.  Aloi telephoned the Union Pacific manager later that day and reported that he tripped.  Union Pacific safety manager and yard manager inspected the locomotive.  The morning after Aloi filed a personal injury report. 

Procedural History:

            Frank Aloi brought a personal injury action against Union Pacific.  Prior to trial, Union Pacific destroyed documents relevant to the litigation.  As a sanction for spoliation of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury it could draw an inference that the evidence contained in the destroyed documents would have been unfavorable to Union Pacific.  The jury returned a verdict for Aloi and Union Pacific appealed.  The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment.  The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari.  The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of remaining issues.

Issue:

1.      Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting an adverse inference instruction to the jury?

2.      Did the trial court abuse its discretion in giving the adverse inference instruction three times?

Holding:

            1.  No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting an adverse inference instruction to the jury.

            2.  No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the adverse inference instruction three times to the jury.

Rationale:

            The ability to provide the jury with an adverse inference instruction as a sanction for spoliation of evidence derives from the trial court’s inherent powers.  In Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo. 1984) the case said that trial courts possess all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions.  A trial court has broad discretion to permit the jury to draw an adverse inference from the loss or destruction of evidence.

            In the case of People v. Welsh, 80 P.3d 296 (Colo. 2003), the court will not overturn the trial court’s imposition of an adverse inference unless the sanction is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.

            The Supreme Court cited two cases that decided on the issue of repetition.  These included Pletchas v. Von Poppenheim, 148 Colo. 127, 365 P.2d 261 (1961) and Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Dev. Corp., 184 Colo 418, 520 P.2d 745 (1974).  In Pletchas, the trial court refused to provide an instruction tendered by the defendant because the trial court has already devised an instruction that rendered the defendant’s instruction duplicative.  The case stated “repetition of instructions, under whatever guise, giving undue prominence to one feature of a case, is deemed bad practice and should be avoided.”  In Pizza, the court stated, “We have held in the past that it is error to give two instructions, virtually the same, which would tend to confuse the jury by overly emphasizing a defense.”

            However, the Supreme Court stated that although they have made general statements discouraging repetition, they have never held that repetition of a jury instruction alone constitutes an abuse of discretion.  The Supreme Court states that the repetition discussed in these two cases differs from the type of repetition analyzed in this case.  In this case the trial court made it clear that it was repeating the same instruction, so the potential for juror confusion did not exist.

            The Supreme Court used the case People v. Welsh, 80 P.3d 296, 304 (Colo. 2003) to decide if the trial court addressed the appropriate objections and articulated the reasoning for its decision.  The trial court stated that it used the adverse inference instruction several times after a great deal of testimony had been given so it was necessary to further the jury’s comprehension.

           

Decision:

            The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by providing the jury with an adverse inference instruction.  They also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by repeating the adverse inference instruction and by interrupting a cross-examination to give the instruction.  They affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals, and remand the case to the court of appeals for consideration of remaining issues.